

## SEE exposure to Greece: Much ado about nothing or a serious threat?


- Since Greece announced that its budget deficit for 2009 was close to 13%, concerns on the sustainability of Greek debt have mounted. We believe a default is unlikely, but the saga could continue to create turbulence and directly impact Greek economic growth, and thus the strategy of Greek companies abroad.
- A slowdown of Greece could in principle have an impact on the open and small South Eastern European economies. Bulgaria is the most exposed as Greece is one of the top-3 export destinations (almost 10% of exports) and Greek FDI in the country is significant. Greek FDI in Serbia is notable as well. However, all in all, we think spill-over effects *via* real links, even if not negligible, should not be considered a major source of concern: #1 trade links are not so important as to be able to affect significantly economic growth, even for Bulgaria; #2 FDI has peaked over the past few years and will not be a driver of growth.
- In contrast, Greek banks provide a more relevant transmission channel for SEE, where Greek banks have a significant role: there are 4 Greek-controlled banks among the top-10 in Bulgaria, 3 in Serbia, 2 in Romania and one in Turkey.
- Market concern on a possible delay of Euro adoption seems to us sensibly overestimated: first, it's a long term process, and second, when entering the Eurozone, CEE countries will be in a better shape than EMU peripheries in terms of fiscal performance.

Matteo Ferrazzi (UniCredit Bank Milan)  
+39 02 8862-8600  
matteo.ferrazzi@unicreditgroup.eu

Milen Kassabov (UniCredit BUBANK)  
+ 359 2926-9508  
milen.kassabov@unicreditgroup.bg

Dmitry Gourov (UniCredit CAIB)  
+43 50505 823-64  
dmitry.gourov@caib.unicreditgroup.eu

### ROLE OF GREEK BANKS IN SEE COUNTRIES (% OF TOTAL ASSETS)



Source: UniCredit CEE Strategic Analysis

**Chief Economist - UniCredit Group**  
**Head of Global Economics & FI/FX Research**  
Marco Annunziata, Ph.D., Chief Economist  
+44 20 7826-1770  
marco.annunziata@unicreditgroup.eu

**Bloomberg**  
UCGR, UCFR

**Internet**  
www.research.unicreditgroup.eu

## Greek spillovers to South Eastern Europe

### A Greek tragedy?

Since Greece announced that its budget deficit for 2009 was close to 13%, concerns on the sustainability of Greek debt have mounted. We believe a default is unlikely, but the saga could continue to create turbulence and directly impact Greek economic growth, and thus the strategy of Greek companies abroad, especially banks. Can the Greek problems have a significant impact on the SEE economies which are in a relatively fragile situation following a difficult 2009?

### Spill-overs to CEE countries have been contained for the moment

The biggest transmission mechanism for the CEE region would come through influence on the South Eastern European (SEE) countries. For now, negative financial spill-overs to Emerging Europe have remained limited: country risk (in terms of CDS) of EMU peripheries and Eastern Europe, for instance, has been moving in opposite directions for several weeks. The whole spectrum of EEMEA CDS premia (except Ukraine and Latvia) now trades inside Greece.

### The main transmission channels

In this piece we provide an overview of the possible Greek spill-over effects for the SEE countries, focusing on the following transmission channels:

- Trade flows: Greece and SEE economies are open and highly integrated;
- FDI: Greek companies are active players on SEE markets in various markets
- Presence of Greek banks in the region
- Possibility that the Euro adoption process of Eastern European countries could be negatively affected

## The channel of trade and FDI

### Greek influence in SEE is not negligible...

The EUR 240bn Greek economy is 1/10<sup>th</sup> of the German economy and 1/6<sup>th</sup> of the Italian economy (Germany and Italy are the main trading partners of CEE). Even so, any slowdown of the Greek economy could have a significant impact on the small open economies of the SEE region. Regarding trade flows, Bulgaria looks to be most exposed, given that imports to Greece account for almost 10% of total Bulgarian export, and less than 2.5% of total exports of Romania, Serbia and Turkey.

### ...Bulgaria the most exposed

In terms of FDI stock, Greek companies have invested significant amounts in various sectors of the Serbian economy, from banking and telecommunications to food processing, cement production and tourism: there are around 200 Greek companies operating in Serbia (and 200 more Serbian-Greek companies) and Greece is the number two source of foreign direct investment in Serbia (with around 14% of total FDI stock). Greece is among the top investors in Bulgaria as well (number four, more than 8% of total stock). In Romania too around 8,000 Greek companies are registered, with estimates of the FDI stock standing at 8% of total. In contrast, Croatia has no such economic ties (negligible role of trade with Greece and FDI).

### Greece is a significant importer of Bulgarian goods in different sectors (rank)

Electricity	#1
Basic metals	#3
Other non-metallic minerals	#2
Chemicals	#4
Paper products	#2
Wood products	#1
Textile	#3
Food, beverages tobacco	#1
Agriculture	#3


Despite the relatively large share of exports and FDI we think the direct consequences of a Greek slowdown should not be dramatic for SEE countries: #1 trade links are not so important as to be able to affect significantly economic growth: Bulgarian trade represents slightly more than 30% of GDP, and the Greek share is less than 10% of this, as mentioned; hence, a possible impact on Bulgarian growth should be limited to a few decimals; #2 FDI has peaked in the past few years and will not be a major driver of growth this year as in the past, irrespective of the strategy of Greek companies.

asic metals


#3

GREEK AND SOUTH EASTERN EUROPE

2009 GDP of South Eastern European countries, EUR bn



Export to Greece and Greek FDI in the countries



Source: UniCredit Research

**Recovery on the horizon for SEE, but growth prospects are relatively poor if compared to other CEE countries**


In the period 2002-08 growth in the SEE region was in line with the average growth of Emerging Europe, with the size of the drop in 2009 being similar too. However, recovery prospects appear different, with SEE economies needing more time to recover in comparison to the rest of the CEE. The region has more difficulty leveraging off an export-led recovery via the exchange rate adjustments (FX in Bulgaria and Bosnia are pegged, while Croatia is keeping the HRK stable), with Turkey being a notable exception.

The banking sector of these countries was also under pressure during 2009: the estimated peak of NPL could reach two or three times the pre-crisis level. Cost of risk (in terms of provisions to loans ratio) is probably going to exceed 3% in 2010 (less than 2% in Central Europe)<sup>1</sup>. Credit growth in 2009 in SEE was close to zero or negative and the outlook for the banking sector remains challenging, with ongoing deterioration in credit quality and low volumes growth. However, the IMF programs, where present (Bosnia, Serbia, Romania have programs worth EUR 1.5bn, EUR 3.5bn and EUR 26bn) are an important source of stability.


<sup>1</sup> See UniCredit Group CEE Strategic Analysis, "CEE Banking Outlook", November 2009 (<http://www.bankaustria.at/en/open.html?opencf=en/17764.html>)

**RECOVERY IN SEE IS DELAYED VERSUS OTHER CENTRAL EASTERN EUROPEAN COUNTRIES**

GDP Growth in SEE (excluding Turkey) and CEE



Foreign direct investments (% on GDP)



Source: UniCredit Research estimates

**Greek banks in South Eastern Europe**

**Greek banks have an important role in SEE economies**

The most pertinent transmission channel from Greece to South Eastern Europe is undoubtedly represented by the activity of Greek banks. There are 4 Greek-controlled banks among the top-10 in Bulgaria, 3 in Serbia, 2 in Romania and 1 in Turkey (no Greek banks in Croatia). The National Bank of Greece, EFG Eurobank, Piraeus and Alpha bank are major players in the region, with assets close to EUR 70bn. These banks represent a large share of local banking sectors: Greek banks account for almost 30% of total assets in Bulgaria and more than 15% in Serbia. At the same time SEE represents a large share of their assets, up to one fourth of total assets for EFG Eurobank, which has an extensive presence in most of SEE countries and more than 20% for Alpha Bank and National Bank of Greece.

**BANKING PLAYERS IN SEE COUNTRIES (NAME OF THE BANK AND OWER)**

Rank	Bulgaria		Romania		Serbia		Turkey	
# 1	UniCredit	Unicredit Group	BCR	Erste	Banca Intesa	IntesaSP	Ziraat	State
# 2	DSK	OTP	BRD	SocGen	Komercijalna	State	Is Bankasi	Is Bank fund
# 3	UnBulgBnk	NB of Greece	Volksbank	Volksbank Intl	Raiffeisen	RZB	Garanti	GE Capital
# 4	Raiffeisen	RZB	Raiffeisen	RZB	Eurobank EFG	Eurobank EFG	Akbank	Citi
# 5	Eurobank EFG	Eurobank EFG	Alpha Bank	Alpha Group	Hypo Alpe	BayernLB	Yapi Kredi	Unicredit Group
# 6	FirstInvestBank	Private	UniCredit	Unicredit Group	UniCredit	Unicredit Group	Vakifbank	State
# 7	Piraeus	Piraeus	B. Transilvania	Local private	Vojvodjanska	NB of Greece	Halk Bank	State
# 8	SG Expressbank	SocGen	Banc Post	Eurobank EFG	AIK	ATEbank Greece	Finansbank	NB of Greece
# 9	Alpha Bank	Alpha Group	CEC	State	SocGen	SocGen	Denizbank	Dexia
# 10	CrpCommBnk	Local private	ING	ING	ProCredit	ProCredit	ING	ING

NOTE: Background is in grey for the Greek banks. Source: UniCredit CEE Strategic Analysis

While the presence of Greek banks in SEE does not represent a problem *per se*, a more inward-looking strategy (i.e. less focus on foreign countries) could be expected. On one side, Greek banks participated in the “Vienna initiatives” (i.e. the commitment by international banks to grant support to their foreign affiliates; this was associated to the IMF programs in Bosnia, Serbia and Romania among SEE countries) and are expected to broadly maintain their exposure to the countries. Expansion plans will depend on funding, and that in its turn is related to funding conditions for Greece as a whole. CDS for Greek banks operating in SEE are now similar (Alpha, National Bank of Greece) or even significantly higher (EFG Eurobank)

than Greek sovereign<sup>2</sup>. SEE banking markets have a generally high loans to deposit ratio - between 120% and 130% for all the SEE countries except Turkey - and the funding gap is financed through foreign funding: the era of cheap foreign funding is over. The loans/deposits ratio is generally higher than average for some foreign affiliates of Greek banks. Deposits represent only a 51% of banks' liabilities in SEE (55% in Central Europe), while foreign funding represent 24% (18% on average in Central Europe).

**Greek banks in Bulgaria are more exposed in terms of credit quality**


Regarding the specific case of Bulgaria, where Greek banks have a large presence, NPLs reached 6.1% at the end of 2009, up from 3.2% at the end of 2008. Likewise, accounted impairment on the income statement of the banking system as a whole increased more than three-fold compared to 2008, reaching over BGN 1bn, whereas the impairment of Greek banks rose more than four-fold. Thereby, Greek banks' share of impairments in 2009 rose by 10% to 39%, while their share of banking assets stood at 28% at the end of 2009.

**Lending channel is more relevant**


All in all, we believe the presence of Greek banks – among the various transmission channels (trade, FDI, risk of delaying Euro adoption) - is the most relevant for SEE, namely for Bulgaria and Serbia. Unless financing conditions for Greek banks improve (*via* improved markets conditions of the Greek sovereign risk), they will remain extremely cautious regarding the focus on their foreign affiliates. As a result, this element will further contribute to the relatively poor credit growth outlook in SEE.

**GREEK BANKS IN SEE**

SEE exposure of Greek banks (% of total assets)



Role of Greek Banks in SEE countries (% of total assets)



Source: UniCredit CEE Strategic Analysis

**TOP GREEK BANKS**

bn euro	NBG	EFG Eurobank	Alpha Bank	Piraeus Bank
Market capitalization (EUR bn, 29 Jan 2010)	12.9	4.5	4.8	2.8
Total assets (EUR bn)	110.5	84	74	54
Customer loans (gross)	75.6	56.4	52.2	38.3
Total equity	9.1	5.7	4.9	3.6
Attributable net profit	0.39	0.17	0.17	0.13
Cost/income ratio	43%	49%	47%	54%
Tier-1 ratio	12.2%	10.9%	9.7%	9.3%

<sup>2</sup> The Greek government was active in supporting its banking sector during the crisis: the support plan for the banking sector was EUR 5bn of capital injections, EUR 8bn of liquidity injections (through the issuance of special bonds) and EUR 15bn of state guarantee. Piraeus, NBG and Eurobank issued preference shares to the Greek state (EUR 350mn, 950mn, 370mn respectively); NBG and Eurobank issued EUR 1 bn and EUR 500 mn of government guaranteed bonds. See UniCredit Group CEE Strategic Analysis "CEE Banking Outlook", November 2009.

ROE	24%	7.3%	16%	9.0%
Loans/deposits ratio	94%	126%	109%	107%
NPL ratio (IFRS7)	5.10%	5.90%	4.80%	4.50%
Total Assets in SEE (EUR bn)	25.1	21.1	16.1	5

Source: UniCredit CEE Strategic Analysis

## Financial contagion still dangerous for SEE, but the fiscal position is very different

Spill-overs could affect high debt-high deficit countries

... but fiscal metrics is sensibly different


EU fatigue: will Euro adoption become more difficult?

The ongoing Greek saga will continue to add some volatility to sovereign risk across Europe, at least during 1H10. Principal focus will be on the fiscal positions: in this respect countries with high debt would be most affected, and Hungary stands out in this respect. Whereas the SEE countries look relatively sound, given that their positions are sensibly better than EMU peripheries in terms of public debt (all SEE countries have debt-GDP ratio under 60%) and public deficit (most of the countries under 5%, except for Romania). Markets have been able to discern the different fiscal situations over the last few months and contagion remained limited. Contagion could be particularly harsh if and only if the Greek situation sensibly affects global risk appetite.


*Last but not least*, Greek problems could put in to question the role of EMU as the optimal currency area and limit further “enlargement”. Market concern on a possible delay of Euro adoption seems to us sensibly overestimated: #1 it’s a long term process and not something that will materialize in the coming months. At the moment the Baltic countries are the most committed to adopt the common currency as soon as possible (2011-13). Bulgaria, Romania and Hungary are expected to join the Eurozone in 2013-14, Poland and the Czech Republic in 2015-18; #2 it’s a process that has fairly clear rules, despite also being a clear political decision; #3 when entering the Eurozone, CEE countries will be in a better shape than EMU peripheries in terms of fulfillment of the Maastricht Criteria (especially on fiscal metrics). If EMU convergence will not be significantly affected, the same is true for EU convergence: Croatia will join the EU soon, while the rest of the countries (Bosnia, Serbia, Turkey) are still some years away from membership.

### FISCAL POSITION OF EMEA COUNTRIES LOOKS BETTER

Fiscal position of EMU and EMEA countries




Current CDS (USD 5Y) and average rating




Note: CE3 is the simple average of Poland, Czech and Hungary; South Eastern Europe (SEE) is the average of Turkey, Romania, Bulgaria. Average rating is calculated as an average of Moody's, S&P's and Fitch. Source: Bloomberg, EU Commission, UniCredit Research estimates

**CEE CREDIT LOOKS FAVORABLE**

CEE Credit outperforming



But east-west spreads have already tightened



Source: UniCredit Research estimates

**Appendix: Which Bulgarian industries could be seriously affected?**

**Export, FDI, tourism**

We feel that the Bulgarian economy is most exposed to Greek problems: firstly through variation in export volumes from Bulgaria to Greece (Greece accounts for over 9% of Bulgarian export), including such by Greek companies which have settled production bases in Bulgaria in order also to serve the market in Greece; second, through changes in investment and spending by Greek companies and citizens in Bulgaria reflected in weaker FDI inflows, as well as tourism revenue (Greek FDI stock is close to 8% of total FDI Bulgarian stock).

**Service sectors will feel the effects**

The **first group of sectors that is likely to be hit includes agriculture, food and beverage goods**, for which Greece is among the top export destinations. Such sectors are likely to be relatively stable, as the Greek economy will continue to import more resilient (in terms of demand) non-discretionary goods, which are produced at lower cost in Bulgaria.

**Greek FDI affected more than average**

The **second group is comprised of services sectors like finance, real estate, trade, communications, transportation, travel and leisure**. This group will be the most affected in terms of lower investments and spending by Greek companies and individuals. In fact, the drop in FDI flows from Greece in 2009 was largely due to significant decreases in financial intermediation (FDI flow in the sector decreased by EUR 249mn yoy in January-September 2009), real estate and business services (FDI flow decreased by EUR 57mn yoy in January-September 2009), and transport and communications sectors (a drop of EUR 46mn). Greek FDI slowed down more significantly than those of the other countries: the overall drop in the FDI flows from Greece to Bulgaria in January-September 2009 versus the corresponding period of the previous year was EUR 383mn, with total flows down 93% yoy, compared to a decrease of total FDI flows from all countries of 54% during the same period. Notably, the FDI flow decline has so far not led to significant underperformance of Greek banks in terms of loan book growth, as they registered a 3.8% increase yoy at the end of September 2009, while the banking system as a whole was up by 5.8% during the same period.

Considering tourism revenue, the beginning of the year has been difficult for the winter resorts in Bulgaria, due also to organized protests by Greek farmers blocking the entry points at the border, and thus restricting Greek tourist flows. Estimated losses for the whole Bulgarian economy from Greek farmer protests has already reached EUR 40mn (according to estimates by the Ministry of Agriculture and Food report published on 27 January), as besides tourism,

transportation and trade activities have also been affected.

In the **third group, sectors exporting manufactured goods, primarily related to construction and equipment manufacturing sectors in Greece are likely to be impacted from an eventual sharp drop of investments in infrastructure**, in addition to the already depressed levels of building construction in Bulgaria and in Europe. Such sectors, in which Greece has been a top export destination, include production of basic metals, non-metallic minerals, wood products, chemicals and machinery. Importantly, this comes on top of a very significant drop of activity in the constructions sector in Bulgaria as well, which does not bode well for investment outlays in this group of sectors in the mid-term.

**Bulgarian manufacturing  
export not immune**

## Disclaimer

Our recommendations are based on information obtained from, or are based upon public information sources that we consider to be reliable but for the completeness and accuracy of which we assume no liability. All estimates and opinions included in the report represent the independent judgment of the analysts as of the date of the issue. We reserve the right to modify the views expressed herein at any time without notice. Moreover, we reserve the right not to update this information or to discontinue it altogether without notice.

This analysis is for information purposes only and (i) does not constitute or form part of any offer for sale or subscription of or solicitation of any offer to buy or subscribe for any financial, money market or investment instrument or any security, (ii) is neither intended as such an offer for sale or subscription of or solicitation of an offer to buy or subscribe for any financial, money market or investment instrument or any security nor (iii) as an advertisement thereof. The investment possibilities discussed in this report may not be suitable for certain investors depending on their specific investment objectives and time horizon or in the context of their overall financial situation. The investments discussed may fluctuate in price or value. Investors may get back less than they invested. Changes in rates of exchange may have an adverse effect on the value of investments. Furthermore, past performance is not necessarily indicative of future results. In particular, the risks associated with an investment in the financial, money market or investment instrument or security under discussion are not explained in their entirety.

This information is given without any warranty on an "as is" basis and should not be regarded as a substitute for obtaining individual advice. Investors must make their own determination of the appropriateness of an investment in any instruments referred to herein based on the merits and risks involved, their own investment strategy and their legal, fiscal and financial position. As this document does not qualify as an investment recommendation or as a direct investment recommendation, neither this document nor any part of it shall form the basis of, or be relied on in connection with or act as an inducement to enter into, any contract or commitment whatsoever. Investors are urged to contact their bank's investment advisor for individual explanations and advice.

Neither UniCredit Bank AG, UniCredit Bank AG London Branch, UniCredit CAIB AG, UniCredit Bank AG Milan Branch, UniCredit CAIB Securities UK Ltd., UniCredit Securities, UniCredit Menkul Değerler A.Ş., UniCredit Bulbank, Zagrebačka banka, UniCredit Bank, Bank Pekao, Yapi Kredi, UniCredit Tiriac Bank, ATFBank, nor any of their respective directors, officers or employees nor any other person accepts any liability whatsoever (in negligence or otherwise) for any loss howsoever arising from any use of this document or its contents or otherwise arising in connection therewith.

This analysis is being distributed by electronic and ordinary mail to professional investors, who are expected to make their own investment decisions without undue reliance on this publication, and may not be redistributed, reproduced or published in whole or in part for any purpose.

### Responsibility for the content of this publication lies with:

- a) UniCredit Bank AG, Am Tucherpark 16, 80538 Munich, Germany, (also responsible for the distribution pursuant to §34b WpHG). The company belongs to UCI Group.  
Regulatory authority: "BaFin" – Bundesanstalt für Finanzdienstleistungsaufsicht, Lurgiallee 12, 60439 Frankfurt, Germany.
- b) UniCredit Bank AG London Branch, Moor House, 120 London Wall, London EC2Y 5ET, United Kingdom.  
Regulatory authority: "BaFin" – Bundesanstalt für Finanzdienstleistungsaufsicht, Lurgiallee 12, 60439 Frankfurt, Germany and subject to limited regulation by the Financial Services Authority (FSA), 25 The North Colonnade, Canary Wharf, London E14 5HS, United Kingdom. Details about the extent of our regulation by the Financial Services Authority are available from us on request.
- c) UniCredit Bank AG Milan Branch, Via Tommaso Grossi, 10, 20121 Milan, Italy, duly authorized by the Bank of Italy to provide investment services.  
Regulatory authority: "Bank of Italy", Via Nazionale 91, 00184 Roma, Italy and Bundesanstalt für Finanzdienstleistungsaufsicht, Lurgiallee 12, 60439 Frankfurt, Germany.
- The UniCredit CAIB Group, consisting of  
d) UniCredit CAIB AG, Julius-Tandler-Platz 3, 1090 Vienna, Austria  
Regulatory authority: Finanzmarktaufsichtsbehörde (FMA), Praterstrasse 23, 1020 Vienna, Austria
- e) UniCredit CAIB Securities UK Ltd., Moor House, 120 London Wall, London EC2Y 5ET, United Kingdom  
Regulatory authority: Financial Services Authority (FSA), 25 The North Colonnade, Canary Wharf, London E14 5HS, United Kingdom
- f) UniCredit Securities, Boulevard Ring Office Building, 17/1 Chistoprudni Boulevard, Moscow 101000, Russia  
Regulatory authority: Federal Service on Financial Markets, 9 Leninsky prospekt, Moscow 119991, Russia
- g) UniCredit Menkul Değerler A.Ş., Büyükdere Cad. No. 195, Büyükdere Plaza Kat. 5, 34394 Levent, Istanbul, Turkey  
Regulatory authority: Sermaye Piyasası Kurulu – Capital Markets Board of Turkey, Eskişehir Yolu 8.Km No:156, 06530 Ankara, Turkey
- h) UniCredit Bulbank, Sveta Nedelya Sq. 7, BG-1000 Sofia, Bulgaria  
Regulatory authority: Financial Supervision Commission, 33 Shar Planina str.,1303 Sofia, Bulgaria
- i) Zagrebačka banka, Paromlinska 2, HR-10000 Zagreb, Croatia  
Regulatory authority: Croatian Agency for Supervision of Financial Services, Miramarska 24B, 10000 Zagreb, Croatia
- j) UniCredit Bank, Na Příkopě 858/20, CZ-1121 Prague, Czech Republic  
Regulatory authority: CNB Czech National Bank, Na Příkopě 28, 115 03 Praha 1, Czech Republic
- k) Bank Pekao, ul. Grzybowska 53/57, PL-00-950 Warsaw, Poland  
Regulatory authority: Polish Financial Supervision Authority, Plac Powstańców Warszawy 1, 00-950 Warsaw, Poland
- l) UniCredit Bank, Prechistsenskaya emb. 9, RF-19034 Moscow, Russia  
Regulatory authority: Federal Service on Financial Markets, 9 Leninsky prospekt, Moscow 119991, Russia
- m) UniCredit Bank, Šancova 1/A, SK-813 33 Bratislava, Slovakia  
Regulatory authority: National Bank of Slovakia, Stefanikovo nam. 10/19, 967 01 Kremnica, Slovakia
- n) Yapi Kredi, Yapi Kredi Plaza D Blok, Levent, TR-80620 Istanbul, Turkey  
Regulatory authority: Sermaye Piyasası Kurulu – Capital Markets Board of Turkey, Eskişehir Yolu 8.Km No:156, 06530 Ankara, Turkey
- o) UniCredit Tiriac Bank, Ghetarilor Street 23-25, RO-014106 Bucharest 1, Romania  
Regulatory authority: CNVM, Romanian National Securities Commission, Foişorului street, no.2, sector 3, Bucharest, Romania
- p) ATFBank, 100 Furmanov Str., KZ-050000 Almaty, Kazakhstan  
Agency of the Republic of Kazakhstan on the state regulation and supervision of financial market and financial organisations, 050000, Almaty, 67 Aiteke Bi str., Kazakhstan

### POTENTIAL CONFLICTS OF INTEREST

UniCredit Bank AG acts as a Specialist or Primary Dealer in government bonds issued by the Italian, Portuguese and Greek Treasury. Main tasks of the Specialist are to participate with continuity and efficiency to the governments' securities auctions, to contribute to the efficiency of the secondary market through market making activity and quoting requirements and to contribute to the management of public debt and to the debt issuance policy choices, also through advisory and research activities.

### ANALYST DECLARATION

The author's remuneration has not been, and will not be, geared to the recommendations or views expressed in this study, neither directly nor indirectly.

### ORGANIZATIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE ARRANGEMENTS TO AVOID AND PREVENT CONFLICTS OF INTEREST

To prevent or remedy conflicts of interest, UniCredit Bank AG, UniCredit Bank AG London Branch, UniCredit CAIB AG, UniCredit Bank AG Milan Branch, UniCredit CAIB Securities UK Ltd., UniCredit Securities, UniCredit Menkul Değerler A.Ş., UniCredit Bulbank, Zagrebačka banka, UniCredit Bank, Bank Pekao, Yapi Kredi, UniCredit Tiriac Bank, ATFBank have established the organizational arrangements required from a legal and supervisory aspect, adherence to which is monitored by its compliance department. Conflicts of interest arising are managed by legal and physical and non-physical barriers (collectively referred to as "Chinese Walls") designed to restrict the flow of information between one area/department of UniCredit Bank AG, UniCredit Bank AG London Branch, UniCredit CAIB AG, UniCredit Bank AG Milan Branch, UniCredit CAIB Securities UK Ltd., UniCredit Securities, UniCredit Menkul Değerler A.Ş., UniCredit Bulbank, Zagrebačka banka, UniCredit Bank, Bank Pekao, Yapi Kredi, UniCredit Tiriac Bank, ATFBank and another. In particular, Investment Banking units, including corporate finance, capital market activities, financial advisory and other capital raising activities, are segregated by physical and non-physical boundaries from Markets Units, as well as the research department. In the case of equities execution by UniCredit Bank AG Milan Branch, other than as a matter of client facilitation or delta hedging of OTC and listed derivative positions, there is no proprietary trading. Disclosure of publicly available conflicts of interest and other material interests is made in the research. Analysts are supervised and managed on a day-to-day basis by line managers who do not have responsibility for Investment Banking activities, including corporate finance activities, or other activities other than the sale of securities to clients.

**ADDITIONAL REQUIRED DISCLOSURES UNDER THE LAWS AND REGULATIONS OF JURISDICTIONS INDICATED****Notice to Austrian investors**

This document does not constitute or form part of any offer for sale or subscription of or solicitation of any offer to buy or subscribe for any securities and neither this document nor any part of it shall form the basis of, or be relied on in connection with or act as an inducement to enter into, any contract or commitment whatsoever.

This document is confidential and is being supplied to you solely for your information and may not be reproduced, redistributed or passed on to any other person or published, in whole or part, for any purpose.

**Notice to Czech investors**

This report is intended for clients of UniCredit Bank AG, UniCredit Bank AG London Branch, UniCredit CAIB AG, UniCredit CAIB Securities UK Ltd. or UniCredit Bank AG Milan Branch in the Czech Republic and may not be used or relied upon by any other person for any purpose.

**Notice to Italian investors**

This document is not for distribution to retail clients as defined in article 26, paragraph 1(e) of Regulation n. 16190 approved by CONSOB on October 29, 2007.

In the case of a short note, we invite the investors to read the related company report that can be found on UniCredit Research website [www.research.unicreditgroup.eu](http://www.research.unicreditgroup.eu).

**Notice to Russian investors**

As far as we are aware, not all of the financial instruments referred to in this analysis have been registered under the federal law of the Russian Federation "On the Securities Market" dated April 22, 1996, as amended, and are not being offered, sold, delivered or advertised in the Russian Federation.

**Notice to Turkish investors**

Investment information, comments and recommendations stated herein are not within the scope of investment advisory activities. Investment advisory services are provided in accordance with a contract of engagement on investment advisory services concluded with brokerage houses, portfolio management companies, non-deposit banks and the clients. Comments and recommendations stated herein rely on the individual opinions of the ones providing these comments and recommendations. These opinions may not suit your financial status, risk and return preferences. For this reason, to make an investment decision by relying solely on the information stated here may not result in consequences that meet your expectations.

**Notice to Investors in Japan**

This document does not constitute or form part of any offer for sale or subscription for or solicitation of any offer to buy or subscribe for any securities and neither this document nor any part of it shall form the basis of, or be relied on in connection with or act as an inducement to enter into, any contract or commitment whatsoever.

**Notice to UK investors**

This communication is directed only at clients of UniCredit Bank AG, UniCredit Bank AG London Branch, UniCredit CAIB AG, UniCredit CAIB Securities UK Ltd. or UniCredit Bank AG Milan Branch who (i) have professional experience in matters relating to investments or (ii) are persons falling within Article 49(2)(a) to (d) ("high net worth companies, unincorporated associations, etc.") of the United Kingdom Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 (Financial Promotion) Order 2005 or (iii) to whom it may otherwise lawfully be communicated (all such persons together being referred to as "relevant persons"). This communication must not be acted on or relied on by persons who are not relevant persons. Any investment or investment activity to which this communication relates is available only to relevant persons and will be engaged in only with relevant persons.

**Notice to U.S. investors**

This report is being furnished to U.S. recipients in reliance on Rule 15a-6 ("Rule 15a-6") under the U.S. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended. Each U.S. recipient of this report represents and agrees, by virtue of its acceptance thereof, that it is such a "major U.S. institutional investor" (as such term is defined in Rule 15a-6) and that it understands the risks involved in executing transactions in such securities. Any U.S. recipient of this report that wishes to discuss or receive additional information regarding any security or issuer mentioned herein, or engage in any transaction to purchase or sell or solicit or offer the purchase or sale of such securities, should contact a registered representative of UniCredit Capital Markets, Inc. ("UCI Capital Markets").

Any transaction by U.S. persons (other than a registered U.S. broker-dealer or bank acting in a broker-dealer capacity) must be effected with or through UCI Capital Markets.

The securities referred to in this report may not be registered under the U.S. Securities Act of 1933, as amended, and the issuer of such securities may not be subject to U.S. reporting and/or other requirements. Available information regarding the issuers of such securities may be limited, and such issuers may not be subject to the same auditing and reporting standards as U.S. issuers.

The information contained in this report is intended solely for certain "major U.S. institutional investors" and may not be used or relied upon by any other person for any purpose. Such information is provided for informational purposes only and does not constitute a solicitation to buy or an offer to sell any securities under the Securities Act of 1933, as amended, or under any other U.S. federal or state securities laws, rules or regulations. The investment opportunities discussed in this report may be unsuitable for certain investors depending on their specific investment objectives, risk tolerance and financial position. In jurisdictions where UCI Capital Markets is not registered or licensed to trade in securities, commodities or other financial products, transactions may be executed only in accordance with applicable law and legislation, which may vary from jurisdiction to jurisdiction and which may require that a transaction be made in accordance with applicable exemptions from registration or licensing requirements.

The information in this publication is based on carefully selected sources believed to be reliable, but UCI Capital Markets does not make any representation with respect to its completeness or accuracy. All opinions expressed herein reflect the author's judgment at the original time of publication, without regard to the date on which you may receive such information, and are subject to change without notice.

UCI Capital Markets may have issued other reports that are inconsistent with, and reach different conclusions from, the information presented in this report. These publications reflect the different assumptions, views and analytical methods of the analysts who prepared them. Past performance should not be taken as an indication or guarantee of future performance, and no representation or warranty, express or implied, is provided in relation to future performance.

UCI Capital Markets and any company affiliated with it may, with respect to any securities discussed herein: (a) take a long or short position and buy or sell such securities; (b) act as investment and/or commercial bankers for issuers of such securities; (c) act as market makers for such securities; (d) serve on the board of any issuer of such securities; and (e) act as paid consultant or advisor to any issuer.

The information contained herein may include forward-looking statements within the meaning of U.S. federal securities laws that are subject to risks and uncertainties. Factors that could cause a company's actual results and financial condition to differ from expectations include, without limitation: political uncertainty, changes in general economic conditions that adversely affect the level of demand for the company's products or services, changes in foreign exchange markets, changes in international and domestic financial markets and in the competitive environment, and other factors relating to the foregoing. All forward-looking statements contained in this report are qualified in their entirety by this cautionary statement.

**This document may not be distributed in Canada or Australia.**

**UniCredit Research\***

Thorsten Weinelt, CFA  
Global Head of Research & Chief Strategist  
+49 89 378-15110  
thorsten.weinelt@unicreditgroup.de

Dr. Ingo Heimig  
Head of Research Operations  
+49 89 378-13952  
ingo.heimig@unicreditgroup.de

**Economics & FI/FX Research**

Marco Annunziata, Ph.D., Chief Economist  
+44 20 7826-1770  
marco.annunziata@unicreditgroup.eu

**Economics & Commodity Research****Global Economics**

Dr. Davide Stroppa, Global Economist  
+39 02 8862-2890  
davide.stroppa@unicreditgroup.de

**European Economics**

Andreas Rees, Chief German Economist  
+49 89 378-12576  
andreas.rees@unicreditgroup.de

Marco Valli, Chief Italian Economist  
+39 02 8862-8688  
marco.valli@unicreditgroup.de

Stefan Bruckbauer, Chief Austrian Economist  
+43 50505 41951  
stefan.bruckbauer@unicreditgroup.at

Tullia Bucco  
+39 02 8862-2079  
tullia.bucco@unicreditgroup.de

Chiara Corsa  
+39 02 8862-2209  
chiara.corsa@unicreditgroup.de

Dr. Loredana Federico  
+39 02 8862-2209  
loredana.federico@unicreditgroup.eu

Alexander Koch, CFA  
+49 89 378-13013  
alexander.koch1@unicreditgroup.de

Chiara Silvestre  
chiara.silvestre@unicreditgroup.de

**US Economics**

Dr. Harm Bandholz, CFA  
+1 212 672 5957  
harm.bandholz@us.unicreditgroup.eu

**Commodity Research**

Jochen Hitzfeld  
+49 89 378-18709  
jochen.hitzfeld@unicreditgroup.de

Nikolaus Keis  
+49 89 378-12560  
nikolaus.keis@unicreditgroup.de

**EEMEA Economics & FI/FX Strategy**

Cevdet Akcay, Ph.D., Chief Economist, Turkey  
+90 212 319-8430, cevdet.akcay@yapikredi.com.tr

Matteo Ferrazzi, Economist, EEMEA  
+39 02 8862-8600, matteo.ferrazzi@unicreditgroup.eu

Dmitry Gourov, Economist, EEMEA  
+43 50505 823-64, dmitry.gourov@caib.unicreditgroup.eu

Hans Holz hacker, Chief Economist, Kazakhstan  
+7 727 244-1463, h.holz hacker@atfbank.kz

Anna Kopetz, Economist, Baltics  
+43 50505 823-64, anna.kopetz@caib.unicreditgroup.eu

Marcin Mrowiec, Chief Economist, Poland  
+48 22 656-0678, marcin.mrowiec@pekao.com.pl

Vladimir Osakovsky, Ph.D., Head of Strategy and Research, Russia  
+7 495 258-7258 ext.7558, vladimir.osakovskiy@unicreditgroup.ru

Rozália Pál, Ph.D., Chief Economist, Romania  
+40 21 203-2376, rozalia.pal@unicredit.ro

Kristofor Pavlov, Chief Economist, Bulgaria  
+359 2 9269-390, kristofor.pavlov@unicreditgroup.bg

Goran Šaravanja, Chief Economist, Croatia  
+385 1 6006-678, goran.saravanja@unicreditgroup.zaba.hr

Pavel Sobisek, Chief Economist, Czech Republic  
+420 2 211-12504, pavel.sobisek@unicreditgroup.cz

Gyula Toth, Economist/Strategist, EEMEA  
+43 50505 823-62, gyula.toth@caib.unicreditgroup.eu

Jan Toth, Chief Economist, Slovakia  
+421 2 4950-2267, jan.toth@unicreditgroup.sk

**Global FI/FX Strategy**

Michael Rottmann, Head  
+49 89 378-15121, michael.rottmann1@unicreditgroup.de

Dr. Luca Cazzulani, Deputy Head, FI Strategy  
+39 02 8862-0640, luca.cazzulani@unicreditgroup.de

Chiara Cremonesi, FI Strategy  
+44 20 7826-1771, chiara.cremonesi@unicreditgroup.eu

Dr. Stephan Maier, FX Strategy  
+39 02 8862-8604, stephan.maier@unicreditgroup.eu

Giuseppe Maraffino, FI Strategy  
+39 02 8862-2027, giuseppe.maraffino@unicreditgroup.de

Armin Mekelburg, FX Strategy  
+49 89 378-14307, armin.mekelburg@unicreditgroup.de

Roberto Mialich, FX Strategy  
+39 02 8862-0658, roberto.mialich@unicreditgroup.de

Kornelius Purps, FI Strategy  
+49 89 378-12753, kornelius.purps@unicreditgroup.de

Herbert Stocker, Technical Analysis  
+49 89 378-14305, herbert.stocker@unicreditgroup.de

**Publication Address**

**UniCredit Research**  
Corporate & Investment Banking  
UniCredit Bank AG  
Arabellastrasse 12, D-81925 Munich  
Tel. +49 89 378-12559  
Fax +49 89 378-13024

**Bloomberg**  
UNICREDIT GROUPR

**Internet**  
www.research.unicreditgroup.eu

\* UniCredit Research is the joint research department of UniCredit Bank AG (UniCredit Bank), UniCredit CAIB Group (UniCredit CAIB), UniCredit Securities (UniCredit Securities), UniCredit Menkul Değerler A.Ş. (UniCredit Menkul), UniCredit Bulbank, Zagrebačka banka, UniCredit Bank, Bank Pekao, Yapi Kredi, UniCredit Tiriac Bank and ATFBank.